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87 
WE NEED A COLE MEMORANDUM FOR 
MAGIC MUSHROOMS 
Robert A. Mikos* 
In fall 2020, as the nation elected Joe Biden to be our Forty-Sixth President, 
Oregon voters also passed a noteworthy new drug law reform. Known as Meas-
ure 109, Oregon’s path-breaking law legalizes the use of psilocybin, a hallucino-
genic substance found in magic mushrooms.1 Measure 109 is designed to unlock 
the therapeutic potential of psilocybin, which advocates tout as an effective and 
safe treatment for depression and other psychological conditions.2 
Given the burgeoning interest in psychedelics, many people are excited to 
see how Oregon’s psilocybin experiment pans out. But at this point, it remains 
unclear whether the experiment will even get off the ground. The main reason: 
we still do not know how the new Biden Administration will respond to Measure 
109. 
Federal law currently takes a very dim view of psilocybin. The federal Con-
trolled Substances Act (CSA) classifies the drug as a Schedule I controlled sub-
stance, making it unlawful to possess, manufacture, or distribute outside the nar-
row confines of a federally approved clinical research trial.3 Federal law also 
proscribes a staggering array of activities related to supplying and using psilocy-
bin, such as providing space where people can consume the drug.4 Federal law 
thus casts a long and dark shadow over Oregon’s road to reform and anyone 
taking a trip on that road. 
President Biden and his Attorney General, Merrick Garland, have yet to 
disclose how they plan to respond to Measure 109. But as we mark the 100th day 
of the Biden Administration, let me offer the Administration some friendly ad-
vice: decline to prosecute anyone that participates in Oregon’s nascent psilocybin 
program, as long as Oregon keeps the program under tight control. The 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I thank Cindy Kam for comments on a draft of this piece, 
and I thank Jason Mazzone for inviting me to contribute to the symposium (again!).  
 1. The full measure can be found at Measure 109, OR. VOTES, http://oregonvotes.org/irr/2020/034text.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/C876-GYMR].  
 2. Id. §§ 1–2. See also generally MICHAEL POLLAN, HOW TO CHANGE YOUR MIND: WHAT THE NEW 
SCIENCE OF PSYCHEDELICS TEACHES US ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS, DYING, ADDICTION, DEPRESSION, AND 
TRANSCENDENCE (2018); Magic Mushrooms: Trip Through the Science, GIMLET (Dec. 10, 2020), https://gim-
letmedia.com/shows/science-vs/76h8a7o [https://perma.cc/7P3X-82A3].  
 3. 21 U.S.C. § 841. 
 4. Id. § 856. 
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Constitution and Congress have given the Department of Justice (DOJ) broad 
discretion regarding how to enforce the CSA. In fact, the DOJ has already exer-
cised that discretion by declining to prosecute crimes involving another federally 
proscribed drug: marijuana. In a series of memoranda issued during the Obama 
Administration, the most important of which is the Cole Memorandum, DOJ 
leadership urged United States Attorneys not to prosecute individuals who used, 
made, or sold marijuana in strict compliance with state marijuana reforms unless 
certain federal enforcement priorities (like selling the drug to minors) were im-
plicated.5 My recommendation is simple: the Biden Administration should issue 
similar enforcement guidance for state-authorized psilocybin activities.  
I recognize that President Biden has previously championed more hawkish 
drug policies, including long prison sentences for drug offenders.6 However, 
even for a drug hawk who remains wary of legalizing psilocybin, eschewing en-
forcement of the federal ban might be the best policy. To make the case for tol-
erating Measure 109, I will draw upon lessons learned from the federal govern-
ment’s response to state marijuana reforms over the past twenty-five years. That 
experience demonstrates that attempting to quash state drug reforms is unlikely 
to succeed and might even prove counterproductive and that tolerating such re-
forms better serves the interests of the federal government.  
When California adopted its pioneering medical marijuana law in 1996, the 
Clinton Administration immediately sought to quash the state’s program and the 
budding reform movement. President Clinton’s drug czar General Barry McCaf-
frey issued a call to arms to all federal agencies–from the DOJ to the Department 
of Transportation(!)–imploring them to use every weapon at their disposal to dis-
rupt California’s experiment.7 Heeding the call, the DOJ raided medical mariju-
ana grow sites throughout the state, and it threatened physicians and landlords 
who assisted individuals participating in California’s (then) novel program.8 
This overt federal hostility toward state marijuana reforms continued until late 
2009, when the Obama Administration first signaled a truce in the federal gov-
ernment’s long-standing war on marijuana.  
History has shown that this hostile federal response was misguided. For one 
thing, it failed to produce the desired effect: stopping states from legalizing ma-
rijuana. Notwithstanding ongoing threats from the DOJ, a steady stream of new 
 
 5. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys 1–3 (Aug. 29, 2013) [here-
inafter Cole Memorandum], http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5WUB-8P57]. See also Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s 
New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633 (2011) (analyzing DOJ enforcement guid-
ance). 
 6. See, e.g., German Lopez, Joe Biden’s Long Record Supporting the War on Drugs and Mass incarcer-
ation, Explained, VOX (July 31, 2019, 10:24 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-poli-
tics/2019/4/25/18282870/joe-biden-criminal-justice-war-on-drugs-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/2NAD-
FK8Y]. 
 7. See Robert A. Mikos, The Evolving Federal Response to State Marijuana Reforms, 26 WIDENER L. 
REV. 1, 5–10 (2020) (discussing early federal response).  
 8. Id. 
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states followed California’s lead and legalized medical marijuana, as shown in 
Figure 1.9 
FIGURE 1: STATES LEGALIZING MARIJUANA 
 
During more than a decade of federal hostility, twelve additional states 
would pass their own laws legalizing medical marijuana. (The movement, of 
course, never stopped. As of this writing, thirty-six states have legalized medical 
marijuana, and seventeen of them have legalized the drug for recreational pur-
poses as well.)  
I have explained in detail elsewhere why federal hostility failed to stop 
states from legalizing marijuana.10 In a nutshell, the federal campaign was ham-
pered by two mutually reinforcing limits on federal power. First, as a practical 
matter, the DOJ did not have enough resources to make much of a dent in the 
marijuana market on its own.11 Historically, the states have handled the vast ma-
jority of all criminal drug cases. Thus, when states like California stopped arrest-
ing and prosecuting people for using or growing marijuana, there was very little 
the DOJ could do to pick up the slack and restore the deterrent effect state pro-
hibitions had previously provided. Second, the federal government could not 
simply force states like California to help fight its war on marijuana. Pursuant to 
a constitutional federalism doctrine known as the anti-commandeering rule, 
states may refuse to assist federal regulatory programs. The anti-commandeering 
rule explains why states do not have to ban marijuana under state law and why 
they also may refuse to help federal agents track down, arrest, prosecute, or 
 
 9. The chart is an updated version of Figure 1. Id. at 2.  
 10. See generally Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Over-
looked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (2009).  
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punish residents who flout federal law.12 These twin limits on federal supremacy 
enabled the states to make marijuana legal for all practical purposes, even though 
federal law continued to ban the drug outright. 
The DOJ’s hostility not only failed to stem the tide of state legalization, it 
may have also caused states to eschew restrictions they might have otherwise 
willingly imposed on marijuana. For example, in the early years of state reforms, 
states did not attempt to license medical marijuana suppliers, monitor their in-
ventories, or subject them to myriad other regulations that are now common-
place.13 The states understood that a tightly regulated commercial market would 
pose an easy target for the DOJ, limited though its resources might be. The DOJ 
might even try to exploit state regulations for its own ends, for example, by com-
mandeering state-gathered data (inventory tracking reports, etc.) to build federal 
criminal cases against state-licensed marijuana suppliers.14 But states also knew 
that the DOJ could not shut down a grey market comprised of thousands of pro-
ducers operating in the shadows. So rather than establishing a tightly regulated 
industry, states instead relied upon largely unregulated suppliers to meet the 
needs of medical marijuana patients.15 This arrangement was hardly ideal for the 
states or the federal government. For example, without measures like inventory 
tracking, states could not easily prevent medical marijuana from being diverted 
into the recreational market. But federal belligerence had given the states no 
other viable choice: unable to establish a regulated market–the approach states 
would have preferred–and unwilling to abandon their reforms altogether–the re-
sponse federal officials might have hoped for, states adopted a very laissez faire 
policy toward marijuana supply. This example illustrates how federal hostility 
toward state drug reforms can backfire: it can widen the gap between federal and 
state policy and undermine the interests of the federal government (and the 
states) in the process. 
After more than a decade pursuing this failed and counterproductive re-
sponse to state reforms, the DOJ eventually relented. Under the Obama Admin-
istration, the agency called a truce, the terms of which were spelled out in the 
Cole Memorandum noted above. In particular, the Cole Memorandum an-
nounced that United States Attorneys should leave marijuana users and suppliers 
at peace so long as they strictly complied with state regulations designed to ad-
dress federal enforcement concerns, like keeping marijuana out of the hands of 
minors.16  
 
 12. Id. at 1445–50. See also Robert A. Mikos, Murphy’s Mistake, and How to Fix It, in MARIJUANA 
FEDERALISM: UNCLE SAM AND MARY JANE 103 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2020) (discussing implications of Su-
preme Court’s decision in Murphy v. NCAA, invalidating congressional statute that barred states from legalizing 
sports gambling).  
 13. See Mikos, supra note 7, at 5–7. 
 14. See generally Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 103 (2012) (discussing federal demands for state data, but also explaining why such demands violate 
the anti-commandeering rule). 
 15. See Mikos, supra note 7, at 5–7. 
 16. Cole Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2. 
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This new approach quickly paid dividends: it prompted states to rein in the 
burgeoning grey market for marijuana. Starting in 2009, they began to license 
commercial marijuana suppliers and impose a litany of regulations on the indus-
try. For example, states began to require vendors to track their inventories from 
seed to sale, barred them from selling across state lines, restricted advertising 
that could appeal to minors, and capped the amount of psychoactive THC found 
in marijuana edibles.17 Regulations like these helped address many of the con-
cerns raised by legalization in the first instance, and the states’ sudden willing-
ness to impose them demonstrated how a more conciliatory federal response to 
state drug reforms could serve federal interests. 
The Biden Administration should heed these lessons. The same factors that 
foiled early federal attempts to quash state marijuana reforms would likely hinder 
the efficacy of any attempt to quash Oregon’s Measure 109 as well. The DOJ 
cannot force Oregon to reinstate the state psilocybin ban that Measure 109 par-
tially repealed–such a move would plainly run afoul of the anti-commandeering 
rule.18 To be sure, the DOJ could try to prosecute the clients, facilitators, and 
providers who participate in Oregon’s program. Given that the number of such 
people is likely to be small, the agency’s limited enforcement resources pose less 
of a constraint on its efficacy.19 But allocating the DOJ’s scarce resources is a 
zero-sum game. The agency cannot devote more agents to enforcing the federal 
psilocybin ban unless it devotes fewer agents to some other federal drug priority, 
like the opioid epidemic which is killing 50,000 Americans annually.20 This sug-
gests that unless President Biden is willing to lose some ground in the war on 
opioid abuse, he will need to tolerate a little more psilocybin use in Oregon.   
Perhaps even more importantly, President Biden should consider how 
states like Oregon might respond to a federal crackdown on state-authorized psil-
ocybin use. As presently written, Measure 109 takes several steps to address pos-
sible federal objections. It stipulates, for example, that clients must be advised of 
health risks before being administered psilocybin; that administration sessions 
must be conducted by licensed and trained psilocybin service facilitators; that 
psilocybin may only be supplied by state-licensed providers, which are subject 
to regulations akin to those now governing the marijuana industry (including 
spore to sale tracking); and that psilocybin may only be used at licensed centers, 
i.e., the state does not allow retail sales or home use.21 A DOJ crackdown could 
tempt Oregon to abandon many of these controls. After all, the state’s regulations 
make clients, facilitators, providers, and centers sitting ducks for federal agents. 
Thus, to lessen the threat posed by the DOJ, Oregon might allow clients to obtain 
 
 17. For a survey and discussion of the various regulations legalization states now impose on the marijuana 
industry, see ROBERT A. MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, AND AUTHORITY 443–78 (2017).  
 18. See sources cited supra note 12.  
 19. Usage statistics show that psilocybin is a far less popular drug than marijuana. See How Many People 
Use Psilocybin Mushrooms?, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, https://drugpolicy.org/drug-facts/how-many-people-use-
psilocybin-mushrooms (last visited Apr. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/4Q4L-UNS5]. 
 20. See Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-top-
ics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates (last visited Apr. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/J4PC-DLEU]. 
 21. See Measure 109, supra note 1.  
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psilocybin from unlicensed suppliers, to use it at home, and to forego the assis-
tance of trained facilitators. For anyone who is wary of psilocybin, such an un-
regulated state program would be far worse than the tightly controlled program 
Oregon now envisions under Measure 109.  
In a perfect world, of course, Congress would resolve the conflict between 
state and federal psilocybin policies. But Congress is unlikely to act anytime 
soon. Consider that Congress has failed to adjust federal marijuana laws, not-
withstanding strong popular support for federal legalization and the dramatic 
transformation of state laws governing that drug over the past twenty-five 
years.22 Until Congress gets around to addressing this latest drug reform move-
ment, the Executive Branch needs to do something to bridge the gap between 
state and federal psilocybin laws.  
To that end, Attorney General Garland should issue a memorandum for 
psilocybin modeled on the Cole Memorandum for marijuana.23 The psilocybin 
memorandum could specify the steps Oregon would need to take (or keep taking) 
to address the DOJ’s concerns and secure federal forbearance. The time is ripe 
for the agency to issue such a memorandum. The Oregon Health Authority is 
currently writing implementing regulations, and Measure 109 asks for federal 
input.24 If Attorney General Garland accepts this olive branch and works with– 
rather than against–state officials, both Oregon and the federal government are 





 22. See Megan Brenan, Support for Legal Marijuana Inches Up to New High of 68%, GALLUP (Nov. 9, 
2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/323582/support-legal-marijuana-inches-new-high.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/YR7D-FTXK] (reporting that 68% of Americans support legalizing marijuana for recreational 
purposes).  
 23. The Attorney General could also initiate rescheduling proceedings to move psilocybin off of Schedule 
I, but such proceedings would take time and the outcome is not guaranteed. See Robert A. Mikos, POTUS and 
Pot: Why the President Could Not Legalize Marijuana Through Executive Action, 89 U. CIN. L. REV. 668, 674–
79 (2021) (discussing limits on Executive’s scheduling authority under the CSA). 
 24. See Measure 109, supra note 1, at § 7(11).  
